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JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION AS 
FEDERAL COMMANDEERING 
Matthew J. Stanford* 
David A. Carrillo± 
Abstract 
This Article argues that the current doctrine of preempting state 
substantive law in favor of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
contravenes core federalism principles generally, the Tenth Amendment 
specifically, and well-established anti-commandeering and federalism 
doctrine. These authorities are all concerned with a core federalism 
principle: state sovereignty.  
The states retained sovereignty when they joined the Union. The 
Tenth Amendment expressly enshrines this retention. Modern federal 
court doctrine, which imposes federal arbitration law on the states, 
encroaches on retained state sovereignty by preempting state substantive 
law. This is erroneous regardless of whether Congress enacted the FAA 
as a rule of federal judicial procedure or as an exercise of its substantive 
Commerce Clause power. Encroaching on the states’ retained 
sovereignty, as the FAA does, violates the fundamental federalism 
principle and opens a path toward disrupting the power balance between 
the state and federal governments that James Madison considered crucial 
to protecting individual liberty.  
When one sovereign comes to dominate in a federalist system, that 
government begins to lose its federalist character. Consequently, conflict 
about the FAA is no dry procedural dispute—it is a battle over the 
republic’s core principles. State courts should continue to serve their 
federalist role and fight in their corners, and the United States Supreme 
Court should revisit its FAA interpretation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article challenges the United States Supreme Court’s current 
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),1 which suffers from 
two defects: it is interpreted beyond its intended scope and, as interpreted, 
it commandeers state judicial power. The legislative history shows that 
Congress intended the FAA to be only a procedural measure. Yet the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as a substantive jurisdiction-
granting law and applies it to preempt substantive state contract law.2 
This interpretation contradicts the legislative intent.  
Even if the Court’s read on legislative intent is correct, the law as 
applied violates the anti-commandeering doctrine. That doctrine holds 
that it is beyond the federal government’s legislative power to force states 
to implement federal programs.3 This Article argues that there exists a 
point at which a statute’s preemptive effect raises commandeering 
concerns and that the FAA has crossed that line. Because federal courts 
assume that Congress intended its statutes to have a lawful rather than 
unconstitutional scope, and because it would be unconstitutional for 
Congress to force states to implement a federal arbitration program, the 
FAA should not be so interpreted. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012)). 
 2. See infra Section I.C. 
 3. See infra notes 171–79 and accompanying text. 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 6 [], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss6/2
2019] JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1399 
 
This problem has become acute with the rising popularity of private 
arbitration as a substitute for judicial trials, especially in employment and 
consumer-protection cases.4 Employers and merchants include 
arbitration clauses in take-it-or-leave-it agreements that parties seldom 
read (much less have an opportunity to negotiate) before accepting. While 
some argue that arbitration offers a faster, cheaper alternative to a full-
length trial, others complain that these provisions deprive them of their 
day in court without any real opportunity to object.5  
State and federal courts have reacted with conflict: federal courts 
embrace arbitration under the FAA,6 while state courts (California 
particularly) fight the compulsion to adopt the federal arbitration model.7 
The Supreme Court has lauded the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements”8 and has promised to “rigorously enforce” that 
policy at every opportunity.9 States have been less welcoming. California, 
for example, has repeatedly attempted to resist FAA encroachment over 
the past decade––but to no avail.10 This Article’s proposal would resolve 
the resulting friction. 
That friction occurs when a party moves to compel arbitration in a 
state court. The Supreme Court reads the FAA to force state courts to 
implement federal policy objectives by surrendering state judicial power 
to private arbitral tribunals.11 Though the prohibition on discrimination 
against federal claims by state courts is well established,12 the FAA 
neither grants federal jurisdiction nor establishes a separate cause of 
action.13 Even so, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts 
contrary state law.14 This Article makes three challenges to that 
interpretation:  
• The Court’s categorization of the FAA as substantive 
rather than procedural under Erie Railroad Co. v. 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whiter Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 554–55 
(2008). 
 5. See Matthew J. Stanford, Note, Odd Man Out: A Comparative Critique of the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s Article III Shortcomings, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 930–31 (2017). 
 6. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 7. See infra Section III.A. 
 8. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 9. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
 10. See infra notes 213–38 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Section I.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
 13. See infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Section I.C. 
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Tompkins15 is historically dubious and contrary to 
Erie’s federalism-preserving objective.  
• The Court’s own judicial-federalism and anti-
commandeering doctrines favor greater deference to 
state court decisions concerning arbitration 
agreements.  
• Recently failed attempts to limit the FAA’s reach by 
California courts16 warrant reconsideration in light of 
these deferential principles. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the current state of 
FAA arbitration law and shows how California law governing this 
procedure—and more importantly, state contract law—are largely 
irrelevant to its application. Part II discusses the FAA against the 
backdrop of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Erie and argues that 
the Court wrongly categorized the FAA as substantive rather than 
procedural law. Part III applies judicial-federalism and anti-
commandeering rules to arbitration and argues that these doctrines 
elevate the states’ power to regulate arbitration agreements relative to the 
federal government. Finally, this Article argues that the FAA’s 
commandeering effect is now a Tenth Amendment issue and, as such, 
states may rely on their retained sovereignty powers to resist federal 
demands to apply the FAA. 
I.  ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA COURTS 
The California Constitution affirms the civil jury trial as “an inviolate 
right” that must be expressly waived.17 California law places strict limits 
on such waivers.18 For example, implied waivers are invalid.19 A waiver 
is valid only if it is “unambiguous and unequivocal, leaving no room for 
doubt as to the intention of the parties.”20 And even then, the public policy 
favoring trial by jury is so strong that courts retain considerable discretion 
to revoke otherwise valid waivers.21 In theory, the California Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 16. E.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469–71 (2015); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 17. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 18. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631(a) (West 2019). 
 19. Walton v. Walton, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 904–05 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 20. See Trizec Props., Inc. v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887 (Ct. App. 1991), 
overruled in part by Grafton Partners v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 485 (Cal. 2005). 
 21. See CIV. PROC. § 631(g); Gann v. Williams Bros. Realty, Inc., 283 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 
(Ct. App. 1991). 
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Court, in its role as final arbiter of its state constitution,22 could hold that 
the state’s constitutional civil-jury-trial right overrides any contrary 
statutory provision23 and even insulate that holding from Supreme Court 
review.24 
Arbitration complicates this analysis. In 1961, the California 
Legislature adopted the California Arbitration Act (CAA).25 The CAA 
makes written agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes “valid, 
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the 
revocation of any contract.”26 Though the CAA embodies a “policy 
favoring arbitration,” this predisposition by no means displaces the 
requirement of a bona fide agreement to do so.27 Nor does any state policy 
support arbitrating matters not covered by an otherwise valid agreement 
to arbitrate.28 And California courts retain the power to quash arbitration 
clauses based on “general contract law principles.”29  
Before the FAA assumed its current form, the California Supreme 
Court had applied the CAA and interpreted arbitration agreements 
according to California contract law with minimal concern for 
preemption.30 And California courts used contract doctrines like adhesion 
and unconscionability to police the CAA. For example, in Graham v. 
Scissor-Tail, Inc.,31 the California Supreme Court acknowledged the 
CAA and still applied California contract law principles to find an 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 69–70 (1857). 
 23. See Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 179 (1864); People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the 
Twelfth Dist., 17 Cal. 547, 551 (1861). 
 24. The Supreme Court “will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and 
independent state grounds.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (citing Herb v. 
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945)). To employ this doctrine, a state’s highest court need only 
explicitly state that its decision relies on a state constitutional provision independent of federal 
law, which is adequate to support the judgment on its own. See Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 
366 (1893). 
 25. Act effective Sept. 15, 1961, ch. 461, 1961 Cal. Stat. 1540 (codified as amended at CIV. 
PROC. §§ 1280–1294.2). 
 26. CIV. PROC. § 1281. 
 27. Victoria v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 833, 834, 838 (Cal. 1985). 
 28. Id. at 838. 
 29. Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 
Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 432 (Ct. App. 2004)). 
 30. See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 152 (Cal. 2011) (finding 
no FAA preemption of the public policy against Berman-hearing waivers), vacated, 565 U.S. 973 
(2011); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 562–70 (Cal. 2007) (holding a class-arbitration 
waiver unenforceable where the class action was key to the vindication of statutory rights); Little 
v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 992–93 (Cal. 2003) (finding no FAA preemption of state cost-
sharing standards); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 
2000) (limiting arbitrability of claims under a state employment statute using a factor-based test). 
 31. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). 
5
Stanford and Carrillo: Judicial Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration as Federal Commandee
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1402 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
arbitration clause unconscionable and unenforceable.32 It reached that 
decision despite the argument made that federal law preempts all 
arbitration matters—which the court rejected.33 
The near-century following the FAA’s passage has seen the steady 
aggrandizement of arbitration to the point that state statutes like the CAA, 
and state contract law in general, have faded into irrelevance.34 Today, 
the CAA lives in the FAA’s preemptive shadow, and the basic conflict 
between FAA preemption and state contract law continues. The 
California Supreme Court maintains that it can test arbitration agreements 
for unconscionability under state law.35 While the California Supreme 
Court acknowledges that the U.S. Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion36 that the FAA limits the states’ ability to regulate 
arbitration agreements, it reads Concepcion as reaffirming “that the FAA 
does not preempt ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability’” and so Concepcion does not bar applying 
unconscionability rules to arbitration agreements.37 Yet, the states should 
not be reduced to this last resort of state contract law defenses because 
Congress never intended the FAA to override state law. 
A.  The FAA Was Not Intended to Overturn State Law 
Passed in 1925, the FAA was enacted to “revers[e] centuries of 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements” by leveling the playing field 
between arbitration agreements and ordinary contracts.38 The FAA (like 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 175–77 (“We thus return to the narrow question here before us: Is the contract we 
here consider, insofar as it requires the arbitration of all disputes arising thereunder before the 
A.F. of M., to be deemed unconscionable and unenforceable? The answer to this question, we 
have concluded, must clearly be yes.”). Graham is now described as “explaining the older 
approach to finding unconscionability.” De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1013 (Cal. 
2018). 
 33. Graham, 623 P.2d at 178 (“While we have no reason to question the primacy of federal 
substantive law in areas of paramount federal concern under national labor legislation, we have 
considerable doubt whether the instant case may be said to be within such an area. Moreover, and 
assuming that it is, we do not believe that the applicable federal law has been established or 
elaborated to an extent which would require us to conclude that it is contrary to our significant 
and uniform rule of state policy applicable to arbitration clauses generally.”). 
 34. See Stanford, supra note 5, at 939–42. 
 35. See, e.g., Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 11–16 (Cal. 2016) (determining an 
arbitration agreement’s enforceability under the law of unconscionability); see also De La Torre, 
422 P.3d at 1021 (“[T]he Legislature has enacted into statute the unconscionability doctrine, 
making it a limitation to the enforcement of contracts in California.”). 
 36. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 37. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 745–46 (Cal. 2015) (quoting 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339). 
 38. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26 (1987) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974)). 
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the CAA nearly four decades later) ultimately came to enshrine “a 
national policy favoring arbitration.”39 Yet, unlike its California 
analogue, the FAA did not attain its modern-policy character overnight. 
Instead, its drafters sold the new statute as a small fix for federal courts,40 
whose doctrine of “ouster” had invalidated arbitration agreements 
regardless of their enforceability under state law.41 Testifying before 
Congress, Julius Cohen, one of the architects of the FAA, explained that 
the bill “establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements” without undermining “the right of each State 
to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.”42 
He assured Congress that the validity of the contracts containing such 
agreements would remain “a question of the substantive law of the 
jurisdiction wherein the contract was made.”43  
Judicial resistance to the new federal statute was immediate. In the 
half-century following the FAA’s passage, courts routinely denied 
arbitrators the power to resolve statutory claims.44 In Wilko v. Swan,45 for 
instance, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Securities Act of 
193346 requiring a judicial forum, repudiating a challenge that the claim 
at issue was subject to an arbitration agreement.47 The Court found that 
arbitration did not provide a sufficiently accountable mode for protecting 
the rights covered by the Act.48 Then, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc.,49 the Court deemed arbitrators ill-equipped to hear 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 193850 claims because arbitrators lack both 
the public law expertise and the remedial power that courts of law 
possess.51 The arbitral role was specifically relegated to interpreting 
contracts and enabling party intent.52  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 40. See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a 
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 103 (2006). 
 41. See Stanford, supra note 5, at 933–34. 
 42. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 37 (1924) (statement of Julius 
Cohen). 
 43.  Id. See generally Moses, supra note 40 (discussing the hearings leading up to the 
adoption of the FAA).  
 44.  See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451 (2011). 
 45. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 
490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 46. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
 47. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433–35. 
 48. See id. at 435–36. 
 49. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
 50. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012)). 
 51. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743–45. 
 52. Id. at 744. 
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The Court’s early resistance to the arbitrability of civil rights matters 
is especially pertinent. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,53 the Court 
unanimously held that courts, not arbitrators, have the “final 
responsibility” to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,54 the 
federal employment-antidiscrimination statute.55 After surveying the 
law’s unique procedural makeup and policy purpose, the Court rejected 
the notion that judges and arbitrators are indistinguishable.56 The Court 
instead drew a neat line between the two. For “the law of the shop,” an 
arbitrator would suffice.57 Certainly this was consistent with the Court’s 
time-honored view that labor arbitrators possess special knowledge of 
unexpressed norms and customs that are relevant to interpreting labor 
agreements.58 But “the law of the land” (resolving statutory or 
constitutional questions) remained within the exclusive purview of the 
courts.59 Alexander and McDonald v. City of West Branch60 are of only 
historical interest now, but they show the sharpness of the shift and 
maybe still represent the right course.  
When the Court decided McDonald a decade later, it retained its 
unanimity in pressing the issue still further.61 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Brennan found civil rights claims (in this case, under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983) clearly incompatible with arbitration, accordingly refusing to 
give arbitral awards preclusive effect.62 “In addition to diminishing the 
protection of federal rights,” he warned in a footnote, “a rule of preclusion 
might have a detrimental effect on the arbitral process.”63 This 
competency-based division of adjudicative power was necessary not only 
to the interests discussed in Alexander, but to those of the parties 
themselves. That is, ensuring the integrity of arbitral awards preserves its 
appeal as an alternative form of dispute resolution.  
Unfortunately, the Court soon abandoned this line of cases and 
changed course toward giving the FAA its present preemptive effect. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 
42 U.S.C.); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56. 
 55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17. 
 56. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56–58. 
 57. Id. at 57. 
 58. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581–82 
(1960). 
 59. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57. 
 60. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). 
 61. Id. at 285. 
 62. Id. at 292. 
 63. Id. at 292 n.11. 
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B.  The Supreme Court Made the FAA a Substantive Limit 
on State Law 
Shortly after McDonald, the Court altered course. Despite the limited 
congressional aim of placing arbitration agreements and ordinary 
contracts on the “same footing,”64 the FAA has steadily come to embody 
a doctrine that far exceeds this modest remedy. Section 2 of the FAA 
affirms the validity of arbitration clauses, “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”65 In other 
words, as the Court still professes, arbitration should be treated as nothing 
more than “a matter of contract.”66 Theoretically, then, arbitration clauses 
are still voidable under “generally applicable contract defenses, such as 
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”67 Not so in reality. The most recent 
example is the Supreme Court’s 7–1 decision in Kindred Nursing Centers 
Ltd. Partnership v. Clark,68 where it rejected a state’s attempt to subject 
arbitration agreements to a heightened “clear-statement” standard:  
A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based on 
“generally applicable contract defenses” like fraud or 
unconscionability, but not on legal rules that “apply only to 
arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” The FAA thus preempts 
any state rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—
for example, a “law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of 
a particular type of claim.” And not only that: The Act also 
displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same 
objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) 
have the defining features of arbitration agreements.69 
The Court has steadily eroded state contract law to accommodate the 
FAA’s expansion. Insofar as it poses an “obstacle” to Congress’s 
purported policy objectives, state law must give way.70 This is so 
notwithstanding the absence of an “express pre-emptive provision” or 
any evidence of “congressional intent to occupy the entire field of 
arbitration.”71 By including § 2, Congress “withdrew the power of the 
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
                                                                                                                 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 65. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 66. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 67. Id. at 68 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 68. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). 
 69. Id. at 1426, 1428–29 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 341, (2011)). 
 70. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of LeLand Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 
(1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 71. Id. 
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contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”72 Or so the Court 
divined. Thus, states must not accord arbitration clauses “suspect 
status.”73  
Therefore, even though state contract law defenses remain technically 
available, the Court’s application of the FAA against anything that 
discriminates against arbitration nullifies those defenses. In Concepcion, 
for example, California doctrine considered all class action waivers 
unenforceable because they were unconscionable.74 Rather than deferring 
to this rule as permissibly invalidating an arbitration agreement based on 
the “generally applicable contract defense[]” of unconscionability, the 
Court held that this was a defense that applied only to arbitration or that 
derived its meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.75 According to the Court, “[a]lthough § 2’s saving clause preserves 
generally applicable contract defenses,” it does not preserve state-law 
rules that obstruct “the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”76 This 
reduces the saving clause to a fiction because any application of a state 
contract defense to bar arbitration is an obstacle to arbitration. Indeed, the 
Court acknowledged that this result is a natural conclusion of its FAA 
doctrine: “[T]he FAA’s pre-emptive effect might extend even to grounds 
traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’”77 
This rule has wreaked considerable havoc. Despite its earlier holdings 
in McDonald and Alexander, the Supreme Court has since invalidated 
state laws requiring judicial forums for wage and other statutory claims.78 
In both instances, the Court found that requiring a judicial forum 
contravened Congress’s intent for the FAA to forbid states from lessening 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.79 Contracts agreeing to apply 
state law fared no better. The Court initially signaled that choice-of-law 
clauses manifested an intent to apply state rather than federal arbitration 
rules.80 It then reversed course in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 73. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 74. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340; see id. at 341 (“California prohibits waivers of class 
litigation as well.”). 
 75. Id. at 339, 352 (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687) (holding that California’s Discover 
Bank rule is preempted by the FAA because it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress). 
 76. Id. at 343. 
 77. Id. at 341 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). 
 78. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 491; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 79. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 490–91; Keating, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 80. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of LeLand Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
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Hutton, Inc.,81 where it held that an agreement to apply a private 
arbitrator’s rules overrides any “special rules” of state law that might 
have otherwise limited the arbitrator’s power.82 The upshot: state law is 
suspect if it attempts to limit the arbitrator’s role. 
The Court has made even the severability of arbitration clauses from 
otherwise fraudulent contracts a substantive federal law issue, further 
corroding state power. When a contract term is ambiguous, many states 
(including California) apply the Restatement, which resolves such 
ambiguities against the drafter.83 But the Supreme Court requires a 
different approach when arbitration is involved.84 Purportedly channeling 
the 1925 Congress, the Court declared the severability of arbitration 
provisions “a matter of substantive federal arbitration law.”85 As a result, 
claimants challenging a contract’s validity must nevertheless proceed to 
arbitration if that contract contains an arbitration clause.86 Like the 
contract’s potential invalidity, state law to the contrary holds no sway.87 
California’s final line of defense was the arbitration clauses 
themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “whether the parties 
have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of 
arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties 
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”88 This is hardly 
controversial: the question of arbitrability should be a judicial question if 
the claim is that the arbitration clause is unconscionable. As a contractual 
matter, it only makes sense that parties be required to arbitrate those 
disputes that the agreement actually covers. But the custom of inserting 
or incorporating by reference private arbitrator rules, a custom blessed by 
the Court, has hollowed out this principle.  
For example, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,89 an employer 
moved to compel arbitration of a former employee’s discrimination 
claim.90 The employee had signed an agreement to arbitrate as a condition 
of his employment, and language in the provision gave the arbitrator 
“exclusive authority” to resolve agreement-related disputes, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
 82. Id. at 63–64. 
 83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 2019) (applying a rule that is similar to the Restatement). 
 84. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443–46 (2006). 
 85. Id. at 445. 
 86. Id. at 449. 
 87. Id. at 447–49. 
 88. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (alteration in original) 
(quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). 
 89. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 90. Id. at 65. 
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contract’s “enforceability.”91 Unconcerned with the employee’s 
unconscionability argument, the Court concluded that the parties had 
delegated the arbitrability question to the arbitrator.92 Like any other 
contract, the Court reasoned, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue 
is simply an additional, antecedent agreement” covered by the FAA’s 
supposedly restorative framework.93  
The resulting landscape is rather absurd: to achieve the FAA’s 
remedial mission, the Court has completely divorced arbitration 
agreements from the ostensibly governing state law. Consequently, 
arbitrators are left with virtually unchecked power in many situations. 
This contravenes congressional intent and the Court’s own Erie doctrine; 
in fact, the FAA’s historical context and the Court’s decision in Erie urge 
the contrary view. By failing to account for the FAA’s unique (and, 
following Erie, arguably obsolete) policy objectives, the Court 
transformed a procedural fix for obstinate federal courts into a substantive 
federal right to be enforced in state courts nationwide. This Article turns 
next to the implications of characterizing the FAA as substantive rather 
than procedural, and then explains why this approach is erroneous. 
II.  THE FAA HAS AN ERIE PROBLEM 
As currently read, the FAA is a jurisdictional anomaly. The FAA itself 
does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction, so there is no substantive 
federal law claim for an FAA violation.94 This requires a federal court 
considering an FAA issue to find some other basis for the necessary 
Article III jurisdiction: either another substantive federal claim or 
diversity.95 Diversity jurisdiction, of course, depends on the parties’ 
citizenship, so it neither creates nor requires a federal claim.96 And under 
Erie there can be no federal common law basis for employing the FAA 
as a substantive federal law claim.97 That leaves federal preemption as 
the only way to make the FAA into a substantive federal law claim. But 
as discussed above, Congress did not state an intent to occupy the 
arbitration field or otherwise to broadly preempt state law.98 How, then, 
can the FAA be a means for preempting state substantive contract law? 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 65–66. 
 92. Id. at 68–72. 
 93. Id. at 69–70. 
 94. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). 
 95. See id. 
 96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 97. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general 
common law.”). 
 98. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court has never confronted the Erie doctrine’s effect on 
the FAA. “The Erie [decision] has come to stand for the principle that the 
federal government cannot use the accident of diversity jurisdiction as a 
basis for making substantive law”99—that is, the state-imposed rules that 
govern a case’s outcome. The Erie doctrine applies here because of the 
FAA’s § 4, which provides that a party may move to compel arbitration 
in “any United States district court which, save for such agreement, 
would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of 
the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the 
parties.”100 At first glance this might be read as a jurisdiction-granting 
provision, but that impression does not survive closer scrutiny. 
In Moses Cone H. Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corp.,101 the Court described § 4 as “something of an anomaly” because 
it does not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.102 
Instead, by its plain terms, § 4 requires some other basis for federal court 
jurisdiction.103 The Court nevertheless insisted that the statute had 
wrought “a body of federal substantive law” concerning the regulation 
and enforcement of arbitration agreements.104 At the same time, the Court 
acknowledged that either diversity of citizenship or some non-FAA 
federal question must be present for federal courts to exercise 
jurisdiction.105 This structure left much of the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements to state courts. Indeed, to the Court, state courts were 
indispensable to the achievement of the FAA’s legislative purpose.106 Yet 
the Court remained dubious of state courts’ obligation to compel 
arbitration under § 4.107 Thus, the Court reasoned that federal intervention 
might be necessary to defend the law’s policy aims “where otherwise 
appropriate.”108 Reconciling Mercury Construction with the current state 
of FAA law is a real conundrum. Does it mean that, absent party diversity 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Stanford, supra note 5, at 943–44. 
 100. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 101. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 102. Id. at 25 n.32. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 26 n.34 (“[T]he state courts have almost unanimously recognized that the stay 
provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal courts . . . . This is necessary to carry 
out Congress’ intent to mandate enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements; Congress can 
hardly have meant that an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced against a party who attempts to 
litigate an arbitrable dispute in federal court, but not against one who sues on the same dispute in 
state court.”). 
 107. See id. at 26 (“[S]tate courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to grant stays of 
litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act. It is less clear, however, whether the same is true of an 
order to compel arbitration under § 4 of the Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 108. Id. at 25 n.32, cited with approval in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
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or a non-FAA federal question, state courts still have jurisdiction over 
arbitration clauses? Theory would say yes, but reality teaches otherwise: 
state courts are essentially given the false choice of either enforcing 
arbitration agreements or watching federal courts enforce them by 
collateral attack (Mercury Construction)109 or direct appeal (Southland 
Corp. v. Keating).110  
And when is federal court intervention to defend the FAA’s policy 
aims justified? This is a particularly sharp question considering the likely 
impact Erie had on the FAA, which was passed in an era of expansive 
federal judicial power. The seminal case of that period was Swift v. 
Tyson,111 in which Justice Story declared that federal courts exercising 
diversity jurisdiction were not bound by the common law of the states in 
which they sat: state court decisions “are, at most, only evidence of what 
the laws are; and are not of themselves laws.”112 Accordingly, the 
Judiciary Act of 1789’s113 requirement that federal courts apply “the laws 
of the several states” extended only to statutory law, reducing state court 
decisions to mere persuasive authority.114 And so began the era of the 
federal general common law, during which Congress enacted the FAA.115 
Then came Erie. In the near-century following Swift, the Court had 
witnessed the fallout from Justice Story’s opinion. A more egregious 
example was that of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,116 in which a company reincorporated in 
another state simply to take advantage of what had become a more 
business-friendly federal common law applied in diversity matters.117 
When the Court affirmed this tactic,118 the outrage reached a fever pitch. 
Far from achieving the uniformity that Justice Story had envisioned, the 
Swift doctrine had instead cultivated considerable uncertainty in the 
administration of legal rights, promoted gamesmanship among parties, 
and exacerbated the type of forum-based discrimination that Swift had 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 5–6, 17 (1984). 
 111. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 112. Id. at 18. 
 113. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 114. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34). 
 115. The fact that the FAA was enacted before the Erie decision potentially affects this 
analysis. Enacting the FAA during the pre-Erie federal common law period could explain why 
Congress neither expressly created a substantive federal claim nor included an express federal 
preemption provision—it assumed federal courts would apply federal common law. But following 
Erie, no such federal common law FAA claim can exist; given this state of the law, the only 
rational way to read § 2 is to mean state common law. 
 116. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 117. Id. at 523–24. 
 118. See id. at 529–31. 
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hoped to halt.119 Writing for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis declared: 
“There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether 
they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part 
of the law of torts.”120 Almost echoing Justice Holmes’s disdain for the 
view of the common law as some “brooding omnipresence,”121 the Court 
in Erie rejected Justice Story’s grand vision and barred the continued use 
of the accident of diversity to subvert state law.122  
In overruling Swift, the Erie decision restored a sense of equilibrium 
to the federalist model.123 It reinforced the integrity of substantive areas 
of law that the Constitution had reserved to the states—including the law 
of contract. Of course, Congress remains free to pass federal procedural 
rules that apply in diversity matters even when they differ from their state 
analogues.124 Even procedural rules that arguably alter the contours of 
substantive rights can be permissible.125 Nevertheless, it is the states, not 
the federal government, that remain the principal drivers of their local 
commercial destinies. In sum, Erie is far more than a choice-of-law 
principle limiting the implications of diversity jurisdiction—it is a 
bulwark of state sovereignty.126 Following that watershed return to 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73–77 (1938). 
 120. Id. at 78. 
 121. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 122. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 123. See id. at 78–80. 
 124. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–74 (1965). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Erie, 
304 U.S. 64) (“[C]omity and respect for federalism [generally] compel us to defer to the decisions 
of state courts on issues of state law. That practice reflects our understanding that the decisions of 
state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as sovereigns.”); Boyle v. 
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Erie was deeply rooted 
in notions of federalism, and is most seriously implicated when . . . federal judges displace the 
state law that would ordinarily govern with their own rules of federal common law.”); Hanna, 
380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I have always regarded [Erie] as one of the modern 
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial 
power between the state and federal systems.”); Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? 
(And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 245, 316 (2008) (“The ‘fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson’ was the 
idea that the mere existence of jurisdiction included the power to impose judicially created federal 
law standards in derogation of state law substantive rights.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Erie, 304 
U.S. at 79)); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”); Richard A. Epstein & Mario Loyola, Saving Federalism, 
NAT’L AFF., at 3, 17–18 (2014) (“[T]he Court must once again begin . . . to preserve meaningful 
state sovereignty over some part of the purely internal commerce of the states; and to ensure the 
15
Stanford and Carrillo: Judicial Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration as Federal Commandee
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1412 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
federalist respect for state law, what exactly is the basis for federal court 
intervention in a state lawsuit to defend the policy aims of a federal 
procedural statute? 
At first, the Court did treat the FAA as a procedural regulation. During 
the Swift era, the Court had no occasion to classify the FAA as substantive 
or procedural. Then in 1956, the Court decided Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 
Co. of America,127 where the Court rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s application of the FAA as a procedural statute to a 
diversity matter in which state law would have required a different 
outcome.128 Noting the state-law nature of the underlying cause of action, 
the Court concluded that it was bound by its recapitulation of Erie in 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York129 that “the federal court enforcing a state-
created right in a diversity case is . . . in substance ‘only another court of 
the State.’”130 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas explained that 
proceeding before an arbitral tribunal might cause a “radical difference” 
in the case’s outcome,131 summoning the Court’s early resistance to the 
FAA in Wilko.132 The Court accordingly held that the enforceability of 
the arbitration agreement was ultimately a question of state law.133  
Regardless of whether the Court was right on the procedural versus 
substantive debate, this was the right result under Erie.134 And § 4 of the 
FAA makes it clear that jurisdiction includes arbitration disputes between 
diverse parties.135 Thus, an arbitration matter should be the same as any 
other diversity action: federal law supplies the procedure and state 
                                                                                                                 
separation of state and federal government operations. Without judicial protection for the checks 
and balances at the heart of our Constitution, those checks and balances will continue to 
dissolve.”). 
 127. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
 128. Id. at 202. 
 129. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 130. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203 (quoting Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 108). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–38 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 133. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203–04. 
 134. And for our purposes, the substantive/procedural distinction may not matter because 
Erie compels the same result in either case: “Erie involved the constitutional power of federal 
courts to supplant state law with judge-made rules. In that context, it made no difference whether 
the rule was technically one of substance or procedure; the touchstone was whether it 
‘significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation.’” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., PA v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Guaranty 
Tr., 326 U.S. at 109). 
 135. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal 
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States 
district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil 
action . . . of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that 
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”). 
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substantive law governs enforceability. Yet the Court balked a decade 
later in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,136 which, 
like Bernhardt, involved another state-law claim brought under federal 
diversity jurisdiction.137 Rather than affirm Bernhardt, the Court 
characterized its earlier holding as limiting the FAA to “apply only 
to . . . two kinds of contracts . . . , namely those in admiralty or evidencing 
transactions in ‘commerce.’”138 Meeting this standard with minimal 
effort, the Court made short work of the remaining Erie concern. 
Bypassing Bernhardt’s substantive classification of the FAA, the Court 
found no Erie issue at all.139 “Rather, the question is whether Congress 
may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect 
to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate,” 
Justice Fortas announced.140 Obviously it may. “Federal courts are bound 
to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters—here, a 
contract involving commerce—over which it has legislative power.”141 
Nothing else mattered. 
Joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, Justice Black dissented.142 
Noting the less-than-conclusive evidence that Congress passed the FAA 
using its Commerce Clause authority,143 Justice Black took aim at the 
Court’s incomplete Erie analysis. Bernhardt’s classification of the FAA 
as substantive left courts just two options: either the FAA was passed 
under Congress’s authority (defunct after Erie) to enact federal general 
law applicable in diversity matters or the FAA was an exercise of the 
Commerce Clause power (as the majority found), thus avoiding an Erie 
issue altogether.144 Neither motive was “clear beyond dispute.”145 After 
all, the legislative history suggested that Congress enacted the FAA as a 
procedural rule under its Article I, Section 8 power “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”146 The same history likewise 
indicated a lack of interest in preempting state law or creating a new basis 
for federal question jurisdiction.147 Relying on the FAA’s judicially 
                                                                                                                 
 136. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 137. See id. at 398. 
 138. Id. at 401. 
 139. Id. at 405. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 406. 
 142. Id. at 407 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 409–10. 
 144. Id. at 417. 
 145. Id. (quoting id. at 395 (majority opinion)). 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 417–20 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 147. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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forged pro-arbitration policy, the majority chose the latter view. But this, 
the dissent declared, was little more than “judicial legislation.”148  
This is where the train left the track. Prima Paint misreads Bernhardt 
by construing the FAA as presenting no Erie problem. As this Article 
argued above, the FAA was intended only to clarify a federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction.149 Federal courts have jurisdiction in two broad 
primary categories, federal question and diversity: 
The district courts of the United States, as we have said 
many times, are “courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess 
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” In 
order to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs who seek to 
vindicate federal rights, Congress has conferred on the 
district courts original jurisdiction in federal-question 
cases—civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States. In order to provide a neutral 
forum for what have come to be known as diversity cases, 
Congress also has granted district courts original jurisdiction 
in civil actions between citizens of different States, between 
U.S. citizens and foreign citizens, or by foreign states against 
U.S. citizens.150 
The FAA does not create a federal cause of action, and there is no 
historical evidence that Congress exercised its Commerce Clause power 
when enacting a rule for the federal courts. That only leaves diversity, 
where federal courts are required to apply state substantive law: 
Federal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative 
forum for the adjudication of state-created rights, but it 
does not carry with it a generation of rules of substantive 
law. As Erie read the Rules of Decision Act: “Except in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law 
of the State.” Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 425. 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 134–41.  
 150. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). 
Removal to federal district court is permitted for “any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) 
(2012). Removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in federal 
court. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983). District courts have original 
jurisdiction under the federal question statute over cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “It is long settled law that a cause of action arises 
under federal law only when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.” 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). 
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sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal 
procedural law.151 
So framed, how can the FAA be read to displace state contract law? 
Following Prima Paint, it was indeed unclear just how far the FAA could 
legitimately displace state contract law. At least Bernhardt and Prima 
Paint had established that the accident of diversity made no difference 
regardless of whether the FAA was intended to be procedural or 
substantive. But these cases left one major question unanswered: what 
about cases where federal courts have no diversity jurisdiction?  
The Court confronted that question in Southland. This case came to 
the Court’s docket via 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which provides for review of 
state court decisions that implicate the validity of federal statutes.152 As 
the Court had done in Wilko nearly three decades earlier, the California 
Supreme Court held in Southland’s underlying case (Keating v. Superior 
Court153) that a state financial statute required a judicial forum.154 Though 
“certain principles” undergirding the FAA warranted a departure from 
longstanding forum norms, the California Supreme Court ultimately 
found that state regulations giving the judiciary the last word prevailed.155 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.156 In a 7–2 decision, Chief Justice 
Burger, citing no authority, wrote: “In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], 
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the 
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims 
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”157 Not 
quite.158 As discussed above, the Court had previously recognized 
legislative exceptions to the FAA.159 More importantly, the Court had 
intimated in Bernhardt that the FAA was passed as a regulation of federal 
judicial procedure. Rather than shed the outcome-determinative character 
that had threatened to limit the FAA’s reach in Bernhardt, the Court in 
Southland effectively held that the Act was both substantive and 
procedural.160 So long as an arbitration clause was part of a contract 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–27 (1996) (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
 152. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6 (1984). 
 153. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev’d in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 
1 (1984). 
 154. See id. at 1203–04.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17. 
 157. Id. at 10. 
 158. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative 
History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 163 (2002) (arguing that 
Southland correctly concluded that Congress passed the FAA under the Commerce Clause). 
 159. See supra Section I.B (discussing statutory claims that are not subject to the FAA). 
 160. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11–13. 
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involving commerce (noncommercial contracts are rare, to say the least), 
no state law could stand in the way of its enforcement, save for the few 
contract defenses that the Court had not already declared inapplicable to 
the FAA.161 After all, the Chief Justice reiterated, the FAA was passed to 
eradicate “old common-law hostility toward arbitration” and to make up 
for states’ “failure” to adequately enforce arbitration agreements.162 
Southland expressly held that the FAA is substantive federal law: “The 
Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact 
substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”163 By regulating 
arbitration agreements, California was venturing into Congress’s domain. 
This conclusion has three flaws. First, to read the FAA so broadly 
contradicts the statutory text, which provides for the invalidation of 
arbitration clauses only “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”164 Properly read, the FAA only 
requires federal courts to make arbitration agreements subject to the same 
rules as any other contract. And even in contract disputes between parties 
from different states—that is, cases involving interstate commerce—state 
law typically determines “[t]he rights and duties of the parties.”165 The 
Court’s sweeping holding in Southland defies this basic presumption and 
impairs state power to govern contracts.  
Next, as Justice O’Connor observed in her Southland dissent, the 
majority’s suggestion that the FAA was a congressional response to state 
resistance to arbitration agreements is historically dubious.166 Indeed, the 
legislative history suggests that Congress passed the FAA to address the 
Swift-era forum shopping—a problem created by federal courts—that by 
1925 had reached its zenith.167 It was not state but federal resistance to 
arbitration that the FAA had aimed to rectify.168 (And of course, that 
forum-shopping problem has since been otherwise resolved).  
Finally, even if one accepts the FAA as substantive federal law 
adopted under the Commerce Clause, Southland did little to resolve the 
intrastate nature of nonremovable contract disputes brought in state court 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 14. 
 163. Id. at 11. 
 164. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see 
Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945) (“[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a 
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, 
in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made 
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the 
State.”). 
 166. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 33–35 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 34–35. 
 168. Id. 
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between citizens of the same state. True, the Court has read the 
Commerce Clause power expansively.169 But not even the most liberal 
application of those cases would support a view of that power that 
includes enacting the FAA as a commerce power exercise. 
In sum, the Court’s treatment of the FAA as substantive law raises 
serious Erie concerns.170 The FAA’s distended scope is only made 
possible by disregarding the federalism principle that lies at Erie’s core, 
paving the way for an FAA that Congress never passed. Erie’s historical 
context more convincingly casts the FAA as a modest remedial statute 
for federal courts sitting in diversity, not as a regulatory behemoth 
designed to swallow up every state’s law of contract. The next Part 
explains how California’s efforts to retain control over its own law of 
contract have boomeranged and instead been used by the Court to propel 
the FAA’s continued expansion. 
III.  THE FAA HAS A COMMANDEERING PROBLEM 
Even if the Court’s interstate commerce interpretation is reasonable, 
the FAA’s reach into intrastate transactions creates a federalism problem 
because it commandeers state courts. California courts have jurisdiction 
over contract disputes between California citizens with a California 
choice-of-law provision. In that scenario there is no basis for Article III 
jurisdiction: the parties are not diverse, and no substantive federal claim 
is implicated. Yet under the Court’s current reading of the FAA, Congress 
intended to supersede state court jurisdiction in such cases. Reading the 
FAA as a substantive federal law matter both preempts contrary state law 
and divests state court jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine should operate here to prevent this federalism 
problem. 
Federalism is a core design principle of the U.S. Constitution intended 
by its drafters to contain federal encroachment.171 James Madison 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (rejecting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act individual mandate as 
regulation of existing commercial activity); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) 
(permitting federal regulation of wheat production for personal use given its interstate impact). 
 170. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of 
Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1313–18 (1985) (discussing Erie’s impact on courts’ 
understanding of the FAA). 
 171. See ANDREW NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERALISM-BASED LIMITATIONS 
ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45323.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y4YK-4ES5]. The 1789 Constitution closely mirrors Madison’s vision, and it 
should since he drafted much of it. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 188 
(1971) (noting that Madison drafted the “Virginia Plan,” which provided “the basic framework 
for the document that became the Constitution of the United States”). 
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described the federal government’s powers as “few and defined.”172 
Conversely, the states’ powers would be “numerous and indefinite.”173 
The limiting principle of federalism is baked into the Constitution’s 
design: the first three articles assign limited federal powers to three 
competing branches; the first nine amendments check federal power by 
protecting specific and unenumerated rights; and the Tenth Amendment 
reserves powers not given to the federal government “to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”174 In other words, “all is retained which 
has not been surrendered.”175 Both anti-commandeering doctrine and 
judicial federalism derive from this first principle of constitutional 
federalism. 
The anti-commandeering and judicial-federalism doctrines arose to 
maintain this division of power and to ensure that federal power remained 
limited.176 On the federal side, the anti-commandeering doctrine compels 
self-restraint on federal courts considering whether state courts can be 
required to enforce federal policy.177 And on the state side, Madison 
encouraged states and local governments to resist federal overreach 
through “refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Union.”178 States 
could limit federal power by simply refusing to be made into instruments 
of the federal government.  
By enlisting state courts to enforce federal law notwithstanding the 
territorial right of states to govern contracts, the FAA’s current 
interpretation effectively compels states such as California to implement 
and enforce a federal regulatory regime. This violates the anti-
commandeering rule because it blurs the line between state and federal 
courts to a degree long held impermissible by the Court in other 
contexts.179 And it contravenes fundamental federalism principles by 
forcing states not simply to enforce the FAA in their own courts but to 
relinquish their longstanding power to adjudicate state common law. 
The anti-commandeering and judicial-federalism doctrines can supply 
the limiting principles that the modern arbitration doctrine desperately 
needs. As discussed above, the present void is largely attributable to its 
uncertain legislative footing. It is unclear whether Congress intended the 
                                                                                                                 
 172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).  
 173. Id. 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend X. 
 175. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“This government is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers.”). 
 176. See NOLAN ET AL., supra note 171. 
 177. See id. 
 178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). 
 179. See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1481 (2018); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–
75 (1992). 
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FAA to regulate interstate commerce or judicial procedure. The Supreme 
Court employs it for both purposes. And the Court has read the statute to 
the exclusion of contrary state contract law, even when there is no 
original federal jurisdiction in the matter. As it stands, the FAA permits 
unlimited federal encroachment into state common and statutory law, 
state court jurisdiction, and state sovereignty. The Constitution was not 
designed to permit federal courts to draft state courts into federal 
service—Madison designed it to prevent that from happening. The anti-
commandeering and judicial-federalism doctrines should prevent the 
FAA from divesting state courts of jurisdiction over state contract law 
matters. 
A.  The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Shields State Courts from 
Federal Arbitration Policy Enforcement Duty 
The Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine bars the federal 
government from forcibly conscripting states to implement federal 
policy.180 Rooted in the Tenth Amendment, this federalism doctrine 
protects state sovereignty by policing “the vertical separation of powers 
between the state and federal governments.”181 The anti-commandeering 
doctrine should prevent the FAA from forcing state legislatures and 
courts to implement federal arbitration policy. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine preserves the constitutional design 
decision “to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to 
the States.”182 “The Constitution limited but did not abolish the sovereign 
powers of the States, which retained ‘a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty.’”183 And the legislative powers granted to Congress are 
enumerated, not unlimited, with all other legislative power reserved to 
the states.184 Because Congress has no enumerated legislative power to 
directly order the states, the anti-commandeering doctrine recognizes this 
limit on congressional authority.185 Four contemporary examples 
demonstrate that the anti-commandeering framework should apply to 
limit the FAA.  
The first is New York v. United States.186 There, New York leveled a 
Tenth Amendment challenge against the federal Low-Level Radioactive 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”). 
 181. Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 548–49 (2012). 
 182. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475.  
 183. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison)). 
 184. Id. at 1476. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.187 The Act pressed states to 
develop waste-disposal programs using a set of federally orchestrated 
incentives.188 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor agreed with New 
York concerning the federally mandated ultimatum to either adopt 
Congress’s disposal framework or take title to and become liable for all 
low-level radioactive waste generated within that state’s borders.189 
“Either type of federal action would ‘commandeer’ state governments 
into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason 
be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between 
federal and state governments.”190  
The New York decision stands for the principle that states must have 
the option to opt out of enforcing federal policy without penalty. 
Congress could not force states to subsidize waste generators or require 
them to implement federal legislation—even considering Congress’s 
otherwise permissible regulation of this activity under the Commerce 
Clause.191 To be sure, Congress retains “substantial powers” to directly 
regulate national issues, even in spheres of “intimate concern to the 
States.”192 But when it comes to participating in the enforcement of those 
powers, states must have a legitimate choice.  
Printz v. United States193 built upon this principle. The issue in Printz 
was whether the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,194 which 
required state and local police to temporarily administer background 
checks for aspiring handgun owners, ran afoul of the constitutional 
principle announced in New York.195 The Court held that the Act was 
contrary to Madison’s vision of state governments that responded to their 
citizens rather than to the commands of the limited federal government.196 
Just as Congress could not order states to adopt federal policy in New 
York, it could not evade this restriction by ordering state officers and 
agents to do the same.197 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–
21j (2012)), invalidated in part by New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see New 
York, 505 U.S. at 151, 154. 
 188. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150–54. 
 189. Id. at 175. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. at 174–77. 
 192. Id. at 162. 
 193. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 194. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–
22 (2012)), invalidated in part by Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
 195. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–04. 
 196. See id. at 919–22. 
 197. Id. at 935. 
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The third case is National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.198 After examining the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s (ACA)199 Medicaid provision requiring states to expand the 
program or forfeit all associated grants, a plurality of the Court stated that 
this was unduly coercive.200 Though the ACA’s use of federal funds to 
encourage state behavior that it could not compel was constitutionally 
permissible, conditioning the continued receipt of existing funding on 
such behavior was not.201 Likening Congress’s Spending Clause power 
to a contract, Chief Justice Roberts explained that a knowing, voluntary 
acceptance of the terms of conditional funding was imperative: 
“Respecting this limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause 
legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent 
sovereigns in our federal system.”202 To that end, the Court expanded its 
anti-commandeering doctrine to include both direct and indirect coercion 
as improper means of encouraging states to adopt federal policy 
objectives.203 The Medicaid expansion’s retroactive conditioning of 
continued funding ran afoul of this added protection.204 This was no 
longer an incentive—it was a penalty.  
Finally, the recent decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association205 shows that federal law constraining state legislative action 
constitutes commandeering.206 In Murphy, New Jersey challenged the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA),207 which 
forbade states to authorize betting on competitive sporting events.208 New 
Jersey argued that PASPA commandeered the states because it regulated 
a state’s exercise of its lawmaking power by barring states from changing 
their laws prohibiting sports gambling.209 The Court agreed, holding that 
the PASPA provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling 
violated the anti-commandeering rule because it unequivocally dictated 
what a state legislature may and may not do, placing state legislatures 
                                                                                                                 
 198. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 199. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 
(2012). 
 200. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 575–85 (plurality opinion). 
 201. Id. at 578–80. 
 202. Id. at 577. 
 203. See id. at 578. 
 204. Id. at 579–80. 
 205. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 206. See id. at 1478. 
 207. Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–
04 (2012)), invalidated by Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 208. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1468, 1471. 
 209. Id. at 1471. 
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under direct congressional control.210 “It is as if federal officers were 
installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority 
to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct 
affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”211 
As currently interpreted, the FAA violates the anti-commandeering 
doctrine developed in these cases because it similarly constrains state 
legislatures (and by extension, state courts). By requiring state courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements regardless of state contract law, the FAA 
arguably presents a more extreme example of federal overreach than 
those struck down in New York, Printz, Sebelius, and Murphy. The 
Court’s reading of the FAA does not merely encourage states to adopt 
federal guidelines—it requires nothing less. Indeed, the current FAA 
doctrine uses the threat of Supreme Court intervention to coerce state 
courts to nullify their own statutory and common law rules governing 
contracts that involve arbitration. The FAA does not merely preclude 
contrary state law or resolve state–federal conflicts, it forces FAA 
preemption of even purely intrastate contract matters on unwilling state 
legislatures and courts. This makes modern arbitration doctrine 
“fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual 
sovereignty.”212 
California is a regular target of such commandeering. For example, in 
Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the California Supreme 
Court’s holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.213 The so-called 
Discover Bank rule had stated that class action waivers in consumer 
contracts of adhesion were unconscionable and unenforceable in certain 
circumstances.214 Concepcion was one such case.215 When cellphone 
subscribers filed a class action lawsuit, AT&T moved to compel 
individual arbitration proceedings for each subscriber, citing an 
arbitration clause in the company’s standard service agreement.216 The 
subscribers countered with Discover Bank,217 which found that a similar 
“scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money” rendered the clause unenforceable.218 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 1478. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  
 213. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 
(2011); see Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.  
 214. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 215. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336 (involving a consumer contract with a class action 
waiver). 
 216. See id. at 336–37. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s Discover Bank rule is 
preempted.219  
The Court substituted its understanding of California contract law for 
that of the state’s highest court.220 Describing the Discover Bank rule as 
“classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable” and thus contrary to the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy, 
the Court quickly dismissed the California contract rule as antagonistic 
to arbitration.221 The Court paid no mind to the rule’s regular application 
in the non-arbitral context or to its statutory origin.222 The law’s 
potentially disproportionate impact on arbitration clauses sufficed.223 
Concepcion illustrates, to a worrying degree, the demotion of state courts 
from “ultimate expositors of state law”224 to mere conduits for federal 
appropriation of state contract law—not to mention the nullifying effect 
on the statutes that the underlying lawsuits aim to enforce.225 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia226 provides another and more far-reaching 
example. There, consumers sued in state court claiming that early 
termination fees in satellite service contracts violated California law.227 
A provision in each contract voided the arbitration clause if the “law of 
your state” considers class-arbitration waivers unenforceable.228 The 
California Court of Appeal thus found that the parties had elected to apply 
California law, which still included Discover Bank when the contracts 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.  
 220. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“[S]tate courts are the ultimate 
expositors of state law and [the Court is] bound by their constructions except in extreme 
circumstances . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 221. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340, 346–48 (emphasis added). 
 222. See id. at 341–43. 
 223. Id. at 342. The Court has since referred to this as “a sort of ‘equal-treatment’ rule for 
arbitration contracts.” See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting 
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017)).  
 224. McElroy v. Holloway, 451 U.S. 1028, 1031 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691) (“[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law . . . and . . . 
[federal courts] are bound by their constructions.” (second and third alterations in original) 
(quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691)); see also Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 497 
(1947) (“In so adjudging, [state courts] are the final judicial authority upon the meaning of their 
state law.”); Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 290–91 (1906) (“The 
unconstitutionality of a statute may depend upon its conflict with the constitution of the State or 
with that of the United States. If conflict with the state constitution is the sole ground of attack, 
the Supreme Court of the State is the final authority . . . .”). 
 225. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Concepcion two years later in American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013), a case which originally began 
making its way through the courts as Concepcion was being decided. 
 226. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 227. Id. at 466. 
 228. Id. 
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were executed.229 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed again.230 Though the 
parties likely understood “law of your state” to include Discover Bank, 
Concepcion had since been decided.231 According to the Court, “law of 
your state” only encompassed valid state law.232 Discover Bank had, 
however, been valid law at the contracts’ execution. And as the Court of 
Appeal observed, there remained a separate statutory ban on class 
waivers in consumer cases—a ban that Concepcion never addressed.233 
These competing interpretations convinced the Court of Appeal that the 
clause was ambiguous, which favored the plaintiffs’ interpretation.234  
The Supreme Court thought otherwise.235 Once again substituting its 
own interpretation of California contract law, the Court deemed the 
clause unambiguous and the Court of Appeal’s interpretation 
preempted.236 Justice Ginsburg observed in dissent: “Today, the Court 
holds that consumers lack not only protection against unambiguous class-
arbitration bans in adhesion contracts. They lack even the benefit of the 
doubt when anomalous terms in such contracts reasonably could be 
construed to protect their rights.”237 
More fundamentally, the Court had seized another state judicial 
function. Beyond defenses to enforcement, the FAA now required that 
courts observe a sufficiently pro-arbitration interpretation of the contract 
itself.238 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 195 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 136 
S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 230. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471. The California Supreme Court denied review. Id. at 467.  
 231. Id. at 468–69. 
 232. Id. at 469. As the Court understood it, California contract law incorporates a 
presumption of post hoc amendment—that is, “law of your state” encompasses changes to the law 
following a contract’s execution, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s overruling of Discover Bank 
in Concepcion. See id. 
 233. See Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195–96. 
 234. Id. at 195–96; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West 2019) (“In cases of uncertainty 
not removed by the preceding rules, the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly 
against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party 
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”). 
 235. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 469, 471. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 238. See id. at 471 (majority opinion) (“California's interpretation of the phrase ‘law of your 
state’ does not place arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing with all other contracts.’ For that 
reason, it does not give ‘due regard . . . to the federal policy favoring arbitration.’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 
443 (2006); and then quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989))). 
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The anti-commandeering doctrine is intended to check even the most 
generous assessment of legislative intent. As the final word on its own 
law of contract,239 California retains the right as an independent sovereign 
to limit the expenditure of its resources to enforce the FAA.240 This is 
especially true where, as here, the federal statute stands at odds with state 
law that presumptively controls this area of the law. Although “Congress 
may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States,” federal 
incursion into such spaces must be clear and deliberate.241 But state courts 
were scarcely a concern of the 68th Congress, whose primary aim in 
passing the FAA was ending the federal ouster and revocability doctrines 
that preceded it.242 Congress intended that the FAA be a fix for federal 
procedure rather than the slow, quiet preemption of contract law that the 
Court has since accomplished.243 Absent a congressionally ordained basis 
for preemption, the Court’s interpretation of the FAA commandeers state 
governments to impose federal arbitration policy. Even if Congress had 
broader aims, the anti-commandeering doctrine requires that states be 
given a legitimate choice when it comes to committing state resources to 
the enforcement of federal policy. And yet, as the recent line of FAA 
cases shows, the states have no choice in the matter.  
The next Section shows how federalism protects state judiciaries from 
being dragooned. 
B.  Judicial Federalism Should Compel Respect for State Courts 
Judicial federalism is the constitutional vision of two separately 
independent yet interconnected judiciaries in the United States.244 It 
balances the Supremacy Clause with state sovereignty: it bars state 
discrimination against federal causes of action,245 while preserving state 
autonomy to set the standards to which state-court litigants must 
adhere.246 In balancing these parallel judicial universes, the Supreme 
Court has never used judicial federalism to overturn substantive state law. 
On the contrary, only procedural state rules that undermine substantive 
                                                                                                                 
 239. See Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 474 (“[T]he interpretation of private contracts is 
ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.”). 
 240. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 241. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1991). 
 242. See Horton, supra note 44, at 444–45. 
 243. See id. at 445–46. 
 244. Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a 
Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 514 (2011); accord Claflin v. Houseman, 93 
U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (“The [state and federal courts] together form one system of 
jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 245. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–94 (1947). 
 246. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945). 
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federal claims are preempted.247 This doctrine applies to the FAA in two 
ways: it should limit preemption to only state procedures that disfavor 
arbitration claims, and it should preserve state substantive contract law. 
The Court has consistently limited its discrimination-against-federal-
claims rule to state procedures. For example, in Brown v. Western 
Railway of Alabama,248 a state court dismissed a personal injury claim 
against a railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)249 
for failure to state a claim.250 Because state courts dismissing FELA 
claims on state procedural grounds meant different results would occur 
in state and federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Georgia’s 
pleading rules discriminated against federal claims: “Strict local rules of 
pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of 
recovery authorized by federal laws.”251 In Felder v. Casey,252 a state 
court dismissed a plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on 
Wisconsin’s procedural notice-of-claim statute.253 The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the notice-of-claim statute compromised 
§ 1983’s important remedial purpose of compensating constitutional 
rights denials by states: “Federal law takes state courts as it finds them 
only insofar as those courts employ rules that do not ‘impose unnecessary 
burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws.’”254 And 
when, in Haywood v. Drown,255 another state court dismissed a § 1983 
claim based on a state law divesting state courts of jurisdiction, the Court 
again rejected the state’s attempt to avoid enforcing disfavored claims.256  
These cases establish a rule that only state procedural rules that 
undermine federal claims are preempted. Yet the Court’s FAA doctrine 
uses the same underlying concern (discrimination against federal claims) 
to overturn substantive state law. That rule should not apply to the FAA. 
Assuming that a defendant lacks the right to remove under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441, a motion to compel arbitration in state court does not involve a 
federal claim. The text of the FAA257 makes the absence of an 
independent federal claim abundantly clear: the FAA does not provide 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 31 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It is 
settled that a state court must honor federally created rights and that it may not unreasonably 
undermine them by invoking contrary local procedure.”). 
 248. 338 U.S. 294 (1949). 
 249. Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012)). 
 250. Brown, 338 U.S. at 294–95. 
 251. Id. at 298–99. 
 252. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 253. Id. at 135–37. 
 254. Id. at 141–42, 150 (quoting Brown, 338 U.S. at 298–99). 
 255. 556 U.S. 729 (2009). 
 256. See id. at 731–32, 737–42. 
 257. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
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the kind of federal claim that was at issue in cases where the Court applied 
the so-called antifrustration principle. Because that scenario presents no 
question of a state procedural rule discriminating against a federal claim, 
the other side of the judicial-federalism coin should apply: respect for 
state sovereignty requires leaving state substantive law intact. 
The opposite result, however, has occurred with respect to the FAA. 
Cases like Concepcion and Imburgia have dramatically reshaped the law 
of contract in California and other states in which courts have attempted 
to protect their state’s judicial power. Even generally applicable contract 
defenses have been gutted if they so much as threaten a disproportionate 
impact on the enforceability of arbitration clauses.258 Federal courts have 
used the FAA to hollow out state autonomy in an area of law long 
reserved to state authority. Judicial federalism has never permitted such 
a result. 
Finally, judicial federalism has at times protected federal statutes with 
clearly discernible, state-oriented corrective objectives. Congress passed 
FELA for the “remedial” purpose of protecting interstate railroad workers 
whose injuries and deaths were not compensable in state courts due to 
common law barriers to recovery.259 And Congress passed 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 “to interpose the federal courts between the States and the 
people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights”—that is, as a much-
needed antidote for the states’ then-demonstrable constitutional 
shortcomings.260 The FAA, by contrast, was passed to address federal 
judicial aversion to arbitration and to reduce Swift-era forum shopping 
but not to impose a new law of contract upon the states.261 Indeed, by 
1925, the federal government was trying to catch up to the states that had 
already adopted their own arbitration statutes.262 Taken together, these 
distinctions should limit the impulse to consider the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence as merely a passive manifestation of judicial federalism. 
Beyond the obvious absence of its invocation in a single FAA case, a 
close examination of the Court’s use of judicial federalism outlines a 
limited-use rule for state procedural hurdles that threaten to undermine 
federal statutes with state-oriented remedial purposes. The FAA does not 
fall under this rule’s federal-claim-protection umbrella. Absent that, 
judicial federalism compels greater deference to state courts concerning 
the contractual legitimacy of arbitration agreements. 
                                                                                                                 
 258. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011). 
 259. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1994). 
 260. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).  
 261. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 262. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress passed the FAA to put arbitration agreements “on equal 
footing with all other contracts.”263 It reaffirmed the status quo264 by 
adding arbitration agreements to an existing body of law that had been 
and (at least theoretically) continues to be in the states’ domain. The FAA 
never purported to federalize the law of contract or to limit states’ ability 
to require a judicial forum for statutes of public import. Nor did it 
invalidate generally applicable contract defenses. Yet that is how the 
Supreme Court reads it. 
The Court’s modern expansion of the FAA has eroded state authority 
over their respective contract laws, blurred the line between substance 
and procedure to avoid inconvenient legislative history, and (most 
egregiously) conscripted state judiciaries and legislatures alike to enforce 
the Court’s aggressive vision of the policy it espouses. California is but 
one example: as a frequent target of FAA challenges, California contract 
law and public policy have been subordinated to the indiscernible will of 
a Congress long past.265  
This should not be. By examining the Court’s doctrines of anti-
commandeering and judicial federalism, this Article shows that even 
assuming Congress passed the FAA as an exercise of its Commerce 
Clause power, these doctrines limit the Court’s ability to force state courts 
to administer federal policy. To be sure, state courts may not use 
procedure to discriminate against federal rights. Yet the FAA does not 
create a new right. Meanwhile, its position along the substantive–
procedural divide remains hotly contested. The FAA’s commandeering 
effect has accordingly traversed beyond mere historical revisionism and 
into Tenth Amendment territory. This does not mean that states are 
forbidden to apply the Court’s version of the FAA. It does, however, 
suggest that they are equally at liberty to refuse.  
The view that this Article urges does not send arbitration law back to 
the 1920s. With interstate parties in a federal diversity case, state 
substantive contract and arbitration laws will apply (as they should) and 
disputes over which state’s laws should apply will be resolved with 
choice-of-law provisions (as they commonly are). In a dispute between 
intrastate parties, state arbitration and contract law apply because there is 
neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction. All is as it should be. 
At least, it will be when a majority of the Court reads this Article and 
reconsiders modern FAA doctrine accordingly. 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 264. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“[S]ave upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”). 
 265. Naturally, a legislative fix is preferable. But because it is politically unrealistic to expect 
one, this Article’s solution is the best presently available. 
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